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In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) the Supreme Court appeared to give to gun rights 
activists what they had campaigned for since the 1970s: a ruling that the Second Amendment 
encompassed an individual right to bear arms for the purposes of self-defence.  But as the 
debate about gun rights returned to the top of the political agenda in the United States as a 
result of a series of high profile mass shootings in 2015 and the death of Justice Antonin 
Scalia in 2016, two things became clear: that Heller had not ended the political or legal 
debate about Second Amendment rights and that the Supreme Court had been noticeably 
absent from the debate since applying the Heller ruling to the states in McDonald v. Chicago 
in 2010.  This article argues that, far from the success claimed by gun rights supporters, the 
consequences of Heller fundamentally undermined some of their key arguments and forced a 
shift in the nature of the debate.  Both worked to keep the Supreme Court away from the 










The unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February 2016 led to much speculation 
about the impact of his death on the Court and its jurisprudence.  Perhaps unsurprisingly 
given his close association with the issue, the Second Amendment was part of that debate.1  
However, the United States’ relationship with guns was already high on the nation’s political 
agenda after a year which, according to some studies, saw almost equal numbers of “mass 
shooting” events and days, and which saw a series of high profile events including shootings 
in Charleston, South Carolina and San Bernadino, California.2  The month before Scalia’s 
death, President Obama announced executive action to strengthen the nation’s gun laws and 
expressed his frustration that Congress had taken no action on this issue: “[T]he gun lobby 
may be holding Congress hostage right now, but they can't hold America hostage.  We do not 
have to accept that carnage is the price of freedom.”3  The response to what were, in reality, 
mild changes strengthening the enforcement of already existing gun laws in the US revealed 
clearly that the culture war over guns in the US remained deeply embedded in the nation’s 
politics: virtually every Republican candidate for their party’s presidential nomination vowed 
to overturn the actions should they be elected, while Democratic candidates Bernie Sanders 
and Hillary Clinton both emphasised the importance of public safety to the debate over guns.4 
In District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008, Scalia, writing for a five-Justice majority, held 
that the Second Amendment embodied an individual right to bear arms for the purpose of 
self-defence.  Two years later in McDonald v. Chicago, the Court applied the Heller 
reasoning to the states.  Both Heller and McDonald appeared to give gun rights supporters 
what they had advocated for decades: a ruling that the Second Amendment protected an 
individual right to gun ownership.  Conservatives were additionally pleased that in Heller 
Scalia took an originalist approach to interpreting the Second Amendment, asserting that the 
provision meant what it was understood to mean in 1791, no more and no less.  But by the 
time of Scalia’s death in early 2016, it was clear that Heller had not brought either exactly 
what they had hoped.  Instead, the Heller legacy included heightened controversy over 
Second Amendment originalism, interpretations of Heller by lower courts that drew heavily 
on the limits to gun ownership recognised by the majority, an increasingly bitter political 
divide over the meaning of the Second Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s consistent 
refusal to hear argument (to “grant certiorari”) in subsequent gun rights cases. 
As the Court’s most vocal defender of originalist judicial philosophy and the individual 
right to bear arms, Justice Scalia was a significant part of recent Second Amendment history: 
his passing represents a symbolic moment in Second Amendment jurisprudence.  This article 
explores the surprising and unexpected legal legacy of Heller from the Court’s ruling to 
Scalia’s death. It argues that the legal, historical, and political reaction to the Court’s 
handling of originalism ultimately weakened its usefulness in the Second Amendment 
context.  This required gun rights advocates to seek new arguments, shifting the nature of the 
debate.  At the same time, while Heller upheld an individual right it also recognised limits to 
that right, opening new areas of debate that gun rights and gun control advocates could use to 
support their position.  Both developments shifted the political debate about guns and 
complicated the legal arguments about the Second Amendment.  But just as guidance from 
the Court became necessary, the shifting legal and political debate worked to keep the Court 
away, leading to further confusion and division.  Thus, far from resolving the debate over the 
Second Amendment, Heller ultimately deepened it.  Irrespective of any changes to the 
Court’s jurisprudence in the wake of the appointment of Scalia’s successor to the Court, the 
history of the debate about the Second Amendment in the years between Heller and the death 
of the opinion’s author is important for understanding both the contemporary debate about 
guns in the US and the history of the Court and the Second Amendment. 
 
1. The Battle Over Originalism 
In the pages of Heller played out one of the most significant Court-related culture wars 
battles: that of constitutional interpretation.  The growth of conservatism in the late 1960s and 
1970s was built, in part, on conservative criticism of rulings by the Warren Court which 
massively expanded the rights of the individual against the power of the state.  Particularly 
unhappy with rulings that protected the rights of criminal suspects, conservatives turned to an 
older debate.  The counter-majoritarian difficulty, a term coined by Alexander Bickel in his 
1962 book, The Least Dangerous Branch, described the problem of an unelected Court in a 
democratic system, arguing that judicial review was illegitimate since it undermined the 
power and authority of democratically-elected lawmakers.5  Such anti-democratic dangers 
were only compounded, conservatives argued, when activist judges interpreted the text of the 
Constitution in ways seemingly unsupported by the text or history.  Accepting judicial review 
as an established part of the constitutional system, conservatives including Richard Nixon 
argued that judges should be committed to “judicial restraint.”6  Such individuals should 
remain committed to the text of the Constitution and not seek to expand it into areas and 
subjects upon which it did not speak.  Judicial restraint would thus limit the anti-democratic 
implications of the counter-majoritarian difficulty and ensure rulings politically favourable to 
conservatives. 
Judicial restraint only solved part of conservatives’ problem with the judiciary however.  
While it made it likely that the Warren Court’s “rights revolution” would not be expanded, 
judicial restraint, with its implicit commitment to the principle of stare decisis, or the role of 
precedent, did little to roll back the implications and effects of liberal judicial rulings.  
Beginning in the late 1970s, conservatives developed the theory of original intent, a 
methodology that asserted that the meaning of the Constitution was to be found in the intent 
of those who created it.7  Alternative methods of interpretation which asserted the 
Constitution was a living document whose principles needed to be adapted to changing times 
and circumstances, were simply the counter-majoritarian difficulty in another form.  The only 
democratically legitimate way to understand the Constitution was in the terms with which the 
Founders would have been familiar.  Originalism offered supporters not only the justification 
of a direct link to the thoughts of the nation’s founders, but a justification for conservative 
judicial activism in overturning precedent: if past rulings did not fit with an originalist 
understanding they could be overturned and on grounds other than preferred policy 
outcomes.8  Influenced in part by the application of the methods of social history to legal and 
constitutional history, however, historians and legal scholars began to see problems in 
seeking the “intent” of the Framers.  Scholarly criticism of the methods of original intent led 
to the development of what came to be known as “original public meaning.”9  The approach 
placed less emphasis on the intentions of those who created the Constitution and more on the 
way in which the provisions would have been understood by ordinary Americans at the time.  
Judges remain constrained by the historical meaning of the constitutional provision, but 
without the methodological difficulties that inhered in original intent. 
Original public meaning dominated Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller leading 
many to see in the opinion the triumph of originalism.10  “[T]he Constitution was written to 
be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning,” Scalia began, announcing his intentions from the 
start.11  Making use of the federal Constitution, state constitutional provisions, state 
legislation, dictionaries, and English case law and legal writings, the majority discussed at 
length the 18th Century meaning of “the people,” “arms,” “keep arms,” “bear arms,” “keep 
and bear arms,” and “a free state.” Their conclusion was that, combined, these phrases 
“guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”12  
Original public meaning saw a common law right to self-defence embedded in the Second 
Amendment.  The majority also concluded that the prefatory clause (“A well regulated 
militia, being necessary to the security of a free State …”) did not, as so many had previously 
claimed, limit the right to militia service but simply “announce[d] the purpose” for which the 
Amendment was written: “to prevent the elimination of the militia” by ensuring that 
individual Americans could not be disarmed.13  Turning to consider 18th and 19th Century 
commentaries on the meaning and scope of the right encapsulated in the Amendment, the 
majority concluded, “virtually all interpreters of the Second Amendment in the century after 
its enactment interpreted the Amendment as we do.”14  In effect, they argued any alternative 
reading of the history of the Founding period contradicted the weight of historical evidence 
both from the time and from subsequent discussion of the Amendment’s meaning.   
Justice John Paul Stevens’ primary dissent for himself and Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, and David Souter, also made extensive use of history.  Not an originalist by 
judicial philosophy, Stevens’ apparent use of the originalist methodology added to the 
impression of originalism’s triumph in Heller.  Accepting that the right to bear arms was an 
individual right, Stevens argued that this was the beginning and not the end of the discussion: 
where, he asked, between the clearly legitimate purpose of gun ownership for military 
purposes and the equally clearly illegitimate purpose of gun ownership to rob a bank lay the 
proper line?15  Beginning, as did the majority, with the wording of the Amendment, Stevens’ 
dissent argued that the majority failed to give proper weight to the prefatory clause.  Using 
similar sources to the majority, Stevens argued that protection of the militia right was not just 
the “purpose” of the Amendment but the primary motivating factor.  In support he pointed to 
language expressing the self-defence reading in some state constitutions but its noticeable 
absence in the Second Amendment; sources contemporaneous with the Amendment which 
read “keep and bear arms” to have military connotations; and interpretations of “the people” 
which suggested the right applied not to all but to a clear subset of the population.  In 
addition, Stevens asserted the significance of debates in the early nation about the proper 
division of power between the states and the federal government, arguing that this context 
was more important than the majority admitted.  In this context, the role of the militia as an 
organ of state not federal power became significant and reinforced a reading of the Second 
Amendment as primarily concerned with a military, rather than an individual, right.  Stevens 
gave short shrift to the significance of 18th and 19th Century commentaries on the 
Amendment’s meaning, arguing, “All of these sources shed only indirect light on the 
question before us, and in any event offer little support for the Court’s conclusions.”16  The 
majority’s ruling, Stevens asserted, was thus not simply the imposing of an original reading 
of the history of the Second Amendment but a creation of a new right, influenced by an 
“overwrought and novel” reading of the relevant history.17   
While the substantive content of Stevens’ dissent sparked extensive comment, the 
deliberate structure of the opinion was also significant: it worked to strengthen the impression 
that originalism could not achieve its stated goals.  Stevens followed almost exactly the 
structure of the majority opinion, beginning with reading the text of the amendment itself, 
then considering the history of the ratification period, judging the validity of post-enactment 
legal commentary and, finally, considering the legislative and legal background to the issue.  
Not only did the opinion offer a point-by-point rebuttal of the majority’s position, by using 
the majority’s framework as well as many of the same sources, the dissent made all the 
clearer its position as a fundamentally different reading of Second Amendment history.  
Scalia and Stevens might both have been equally correct in their readings, just as they might 
be equally wrong, but both were reasonable understandings of the history revealed in their 
sources.  While perhaps unsurprising to historians, when read together the two opinions 
offered a fundamental challenge to originalism’s claim to limit the role of judicial discretion 
in constitutional interpretation: because judgment is crucial to historical enquiry, turning to 
history in constitutional interpretation might provide some limit judicial discretion, for 
example in terms of policy-oriented decision-making, but fail to limit judicial discretion 
entirely. 18  This is not to suggest that such complexities discredit originalism’s role in or 
contribution to constitutional interpretation, only to indicate that they undermine any claim 
for Heller as a “triumph” of originalism.   
Claims of originalism’s triumph in Heller were also weakened by the mountain of 
scholarship exploring the historical roots of the Second Amendment.  Historians offered both 
support for and criticism of the historical readings offered by Scalia and Stevens, examining 
almost every aspect of the colonial and early American experience with guns and leaving 
little of the relevant history unexamined.  State constitutional requirements both 
contemporaneous with and subsequent to ratification of the Second Amendment, the drafting 
history of the Second Amendment and the relative importance of language ultimately 
discarded by the First Congress, the exemption of Quakers and the debate over conscientious 
objection, the Pennsylvania Constitution, English common law, and 19th Century sources 
explicating the meaning of the Second Amendment all received scholarly attention.  Studies 
offered competing views of the proper role of preambles generally and the Second 
Amendment’s prefatory clause in particular while providing contradictory readings of key 
Second Amendment phrases “the people,” “arms,” and “keep and bear arms,” following the 
template established by Scalia and Stevens.19  The complexity of the history surrounding the 
nation’s early relationship with guns and gun laws challenged the apparent simplicity offered 
by both Scalia and Stevens, leaving the impression that it could only be so simple if 
“inconvenient” elements of that history were overlooked. 
Historians and legal scholars alike openly charged the Justices and each other with 
picking and choosing historical facts to support their case.  Criticisms of so-called “law office 
history,” defined as “a results oriented methodology in which evidence is selectively gathered 
and interpreted to produce a preordained conclusion,” became common in Second 
Amendment scholarship.20  Such criticisms were designed, in part, to de-legitimise the 
conclusions reached by Scalia and Stevens in Heller while also challenging the growing body 
of legal and historical scholarship with which the authors disagreed.  Collectively, the 
complexity of the historical picture and the methodological criticisms inherent in claims of 
“law office history” implied, and sometimes explicitly stated, that despite the Court’s claims 
for an originalist approach to the Second Amendment, the Justices were simply playing 
politics with history. 
Equally damaging for Heller’s originalist legacy was that a number of leading 
conservatives also criticised the ruling.  Federal judge Richard Posner decried Scalia’s “faux 
originalism” in an article for the New Republic just two months after Heller was decided.21 In 
a speech before the Federalist Society in November, leading conservative law professor 
Nelson Lund took Scalia to task for his poor and inconsistent use of history and for ignoring 
original meaning.22  The following year, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson offered arguably the most 
stinging rebuke to the Heller majority by comparing it to conservatives’ bête noir: the Court’s 
1973 abortion ruling in Roe v. Wade.  Not only did the ruling fail to adhere to a conservative 
judicial methodology, according to Wilkinson, it actually “encourages Americans to do what 
conservative jurists warned for years they should not do: bypass the ballot and seek to press 
their political agenda in the courts.”23  On the surface, Heller represented the epitome of 
originalism that conservative legal scholars had been advocating for more than two decades; 
conservative critics asserted that surface was as deep as it went and that the Heller majority 
had singularly failed to correctly adhere to an originalist methodology.  Not only was Heller 
not good originalism but, according to Wilkinson, it revealed exactly what liberal critics of 
the approach claimed: that it “is not determinate enough to constrain judges’ discretion to 
decide cases based on the outcomes they prefer.”24 
Criticism of the Court, whether from academics, practitioners of law, or the public, has 
historically had little influence in keeping the Court away from particular issues.  Roe v. 
Wade and the abortion debate is only one example.  But the criticisms of Heller challenged 
not only the result but the majority’s entire methodology.  Scalia described Heller as the 
greatest “vindication of originalism,” and commentators have consistently recognised the 
importance of originalism for Heller and the significance of Heller for originalism.25  But the 
combined response to Heller ensured it was far from the triumph that Scalia claimed.  The 
conflict within its pages between the history offered by Scalia and Stevens revealed clearly 
that reaching back into the past and finding the relevant history might not, by itself, provide 
the necessary answers, especially when that history is contested.  The subsequent historical 
scholarship only confirmed the complexity of Second Amendment history, and complexity 
made it possible that judgment, whether deliberate or inadvertent, played a role in Heller, in 
contradiction to originalism’s stated intentions.  Scalia himself appeared to recognise that the 
combination of Stevens’ dissent and the weight of subsequent scholarship had weakened the 
rationale in Heller when he commented to Marcia Coyle in 2011 that, “We won’t apply that 
reasoning in the next case.  Very disappointing.”26  The irony of Heller for conservatives and 
originalists, then, is that the case which in its fundamental approach appeared to be the 
epitome of originalist jurisprudence ultimately weakened originalism in its Second 
Amendment context, requiring gun rights supporters to look for alternative justifications for 
their policy positions. 
 
2. An Individual Right 
Before Heller, one of the leading debates about the Second Amendment involved 
questions about its scope: did it, as gun rights advocates asserted, protect a broad individual 
right to bear arms, or, as gun control advocates claimed, did the prefatory clause establish a 
limited collective right linked to participation in the militia or its modern equivalent?  In a 
hugely influential 1989 Yale Law Journal article, Sanford Levinson argued that the Second 
Amendment embodied an individual right to bear arms, and that this was “embarrassing” to 
liberals who failed to take this meaning seriously.27  Levinson’s article sparked an enormous 
wave of Second Amendment legal and historical scholarship, most of it supportive of the 
individual rights view.  So dominant was the view that the Amendment protected an 
individual right that in 1995 Glenn Harlan Reynolds coined for it the term “Standard Model” 
and in 2000 Nelson Lund declared over the intellectual debate about individual versus 
collective rights in the Second Amendment.28  The individual rights position of the Standard 
Model gained increased support as gun rights advocates, seeking to liberalise state and 
national gun laws, drew on its positions for intellectual legitimacy in the political realm. As 
the nation became more politically conservative, gun rights advocates saw the potential for 
success in an argument which emphasised the role of the individual and limited government 
and tied both to the nation’s founding.  But claims by Lund and others that the Standard 
Model had won out came notwithstanding the significant scholarship which challenged the 
individual rights position and offered alternatives in the form of collective or civic rights 
arguments.29  Equally supported by strong historical and legal scholarship, such views were 
not, as the “Standard” Model implied, intellectual outsiders, although supported by fewer 
scholars.  By the time of Heller, all theories continued to attract support within the legal, 
academic, and political realms. 
On the surface, as with originalism, the Heller majority appeared to give gun rights 
supporters exactly what they had campaigned for: recognition that the Second Amendment 
guaranteed an individual, not a collective, right to gun ownership.30  The National Rifle 
Association, the nation’s largest gun rights organisation, clearly interpreted Heller in this 
way.  “The Second Amendment as an individual right now becomes a real permanent part of 
American constitutional law,” declared Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre.31  The 
Association’s chief lobbyist, Chris Cox, echoed the sentiment, calling Heller a “monumental 
decision ... This has put politicians on notice that this is a fundamental right ... It can’t be 
rationed.  It can’t be unduly restricted on the whims of local officials.”32  Cox’s comments 
hinted at another position that many gun rights supporters saw as reinforced by Heller: that 
the individual right protected by the Second Amendment was absolute and inviolable.  One 
does not necessarily have to agree with Patrick Charles’ 2015 assessment that, “it was not 
until after Heller that the absolutist view of the Second Amendment became a fixture within 
the political discourse,” to agree that many nonetheless used Heller’s emphasis on an 
individual right to defend an absolutist position.33  Speeches by leading conservatives, 
including Mitch McConnell, Rick Santorum, and Sarah Palin emphasised such arguments and 
the 2012 Republican National Platform asserted that gun licences and registration, limited 
capacity magazines, and regulation of ammunition must be opposed with equal force as 
attempts to ban outright certain classes of weapons.34   
However, the Heller opinion included a significant caveat that limited gun rights 
advocates’ ability to link Heller’s support for an individual right to an absolutist 
interpretation of the Second Amendment.  “Like most rights,” Scalia wrote for the majority, 
“the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”  In a passage that has 
confused many scholars, infuriated some gun rights supporters, and given hope to many gun 
control advocates, the opinion continued: “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally 
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale 
of arms.”35  Criticised by liberals and conservatives alike as inconsistent with an originalist 
interpretation of the Second Amendment and as lacking discussion within the pages of the 
opinion, the majority’s recognition of the constitutional legitimacy of some regulations on 
gun ownership represented a significant limitation to the scope of the individual right. 
Why in an opinion so self-consciously originalist and so clearly committed to an 
individual right to bear arms did the majority offer exceptions that potentially limited both?  
The rationale for the list of acceptable gun regulations is unclear from the pages of Heller, 
but can be understood in the context of the general working of the Court.  First, the position 
was consistent with the Court’s understanding of limits to other fundamental rights.36  The 
Court has never found any right to be absolute in any and all circumstances.  Second, it is 
possible that the language was inserted to gain or keep the five-Justice majority. While 
Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas had been consistent advocates for an originalist 
perspective, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Alito and Anthony Kennedy often 
looked to other sources and may not have been entirely convinced by an entirely originalist 
argument.37  As Adam Winkler commented, “the originalists on the Court had to sell their 
originalist souls to survive.”38  Third, the comments can be read as a response to the 
dissenters’ concerns about the potential dangers of an unlimited right to gun ownership.39  
Challenged by claims that the Court’s ruling would lead to inconsistent decisions, policy-
making by judges, and increased danger to law-abiding Americans, the majority sought to 
defend their approach and dispel such claims by indicating limits to the scope of their 
holding.  Fourth is the question of public legitimacy.  The exact relationship between public 
opinion and the Supreme Court is unclear but most scholars agree that the Court is rarely out 
of line with public opinion for long and the Justices are aware that the Court’s institutional 
legitimacy is threatened when making decisions which challenge public opinion.40  Studies 
suggest that most Americans support both an individual right to own guns for self-defence 
and reasonable gun regulations; thus a ruling challenging either of these might lead to a 
public backlash against the Court.41  A rational actor, seeking to preserve their influence in 
the most effective way, might judge that conceding on the issue of reasonable, already-
existing regulations while pressing a preferred reading of the broad right in general, might 
offer the best way to ensure continued legitimacy and the opportunity to revisit the issue at a 
later date.   
The full significance of the Heller majority’s acceptance of limits on gun ownership 
became clearer with subsequent events.  The vast majority of courts that upheld gun 
regulations against legal challenges did so using the list of acceptable restrictions offered by 
Scalia.  By March 2015, more than nine hundred cases had been heard at state and federal 
level and, while not all laws survived the challenge, the vast majority were upheld by the 
courts.42  Among the laws upheld were those restricting gun ownership by convicted felons, 
drug addicts, those with a history of mental illness, and individuals convicted of domestic 
violence charges; restricting access to “unusual” weapons including sawed-off shotguns, 
machine guns, grenades, pipe bombs, and assault weapons; preventing carrying of guns in 
sensitive places such as schools, parks, and government buildings; requiring gun owners to 
obtain a licence and permitting restrictions on issuing of such licences; regulating storage of 
weapons; requiring background checks before the sale of firearms; and outlawing the sale of 
firearms to minors.43  On the few occasions when federal courts struck down gun regulations, 
the level of commentary indicated their unusual nature.44  Thus while they were no more than 
dicta, legal writings with no binding force, subsequent Second Amendment litigation partially 
bore out the 2009 prediction made by Denis Henigan, then Vice President for Law and Policy 
of gun control advocacy group the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, that Scalia’s 
“laundry list” of potentially acceptable regulations were “likely to be among the most 
influential dicta in the Court’s history.”45  Although in a 2013 petition to the Supreme Court, 
the National Rifle Association claimed that lower federal courts had been engaging in 
“massive resistance” to the Court’s rulings in Heller and McDonald, their argument 
overlooked the fact that the foundation of the majority of lower court decisions upholding 
restrictions on gun ownership and use rested explicitly on the reasoning offered by the 
majority in Heller.46  Heller itself then undermined the ability of gun rights advocates to 
equate an individual right with an unlimited right. 
The listed exceptions in Scalia’s majority opinion had something in common: they were 
all designed to protect the vulnerable in society from the danger inherent in firearms when 
misused.  As such they bore a striking similarity, in impact if not in approach, to the 
reasoning offered by Justice Breyer in dissent.  Curiously absent from the initial debate about 
Heller, drowned out by “the titanic clash of the competing historical visions” offered by 
Scalia and Stevens, Breyer offered a clear, compelling alternative way of understanding the 
Court’s role in interpreting the Second Amendment.47  That role, Breyer asserted, was to 
balance the interests of gun owners against the interests of states in protecting their 
populations from danger, “with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on one side 
and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the only question being whether 
the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the 
latter.”48  In emphasising a public safety rationale, Breyer drew on an argument at least as old 
as the Second Amendment: the so-called police powers doctrine recognises as important and 
legitimate the state interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.  
Discussing in some detail the statistics on gun crime and gun deaths considered by the 
District of Colombia, in particular statistics about gun crime in urban areas, Breyer presented 
the challenged law as a reasoned and reasonable action by the District in response to a 
particular local problem deemed to threaten public safety.  Reasonable people might disagree 
about the proper approach to that problem, argued Breyer, but it was not the Court’s job to 
judge whether the path chosen was correct or otherwise, only whether it fell within the 
legislature’s authority.  Because studies on gun control could neither show such laws were 
entirely ineffective nor that the legislative judgments were “incorrect,” the District’s 
reasoning was entitled to considerable weight when judging the law’s constitutionality, 
something, Breyer argued, the majority had failed to adequately consider.49  Dismissed by 
Scalia’s majority opinion, Breyer’s rationale in defence of the state’s police powers 
nevertheless provided a clear framework for assessing the public safety rationale that was 
implicit in the majority’s list of acceptable gun control regulations. 
The frequency of mass shooting events in the US after Heller gave added force to an 
approach which read Breyer’s public safety rationale into the gun regulations accepted by the 
Heller majority.  In defending its 2013 assault weapons ban against a legal challenge by the 
NRA, the town of Highland Park, Illinois explicitly drew on recent events.  Directly 
referencing the 2012 cinema shooting in Aurora, Colorado, the January 2013 shooting of 
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in Casas Adobes, Arizona, and the shootings at Santa 
Monica College, California in June the same year, the city’s brief to the Court argued: 
“Highland Park is a vibrant, suburban community with a number of locations and events 
susceptible to a mass shooting … The record below established that mass shootings incidents 
occur too frequently in the United States, and that it is reasonable for a municipality 
susceptible to such events to want to avoid even a single one.”50  Both the mayor and the 
chief of police testified that such events played a role in the discussion of the city’s 
ordinance, evidenced in the language of the ordinance itself: “recent incidents in Aurora, 
Colorado; Newtown, Connecticut; Tucson, Arizona; and Santa Monica, California 
demonstrate that gun violence is not limited to urban settings, but is also, tragically, a reality 
in many suburban and small town locations as well.”51  Thus subsequent events gave greater 
force and resonance to the public safety rationale that was only implicit in Heller but to 
which the majority’s recognition of some restrictions opened the door. 
Heller’s impact on the debate over guns in American society extended well beyond the 
courts, however.  The question of limits to the Second Amendment right continued to cause 
controversy.  A 2013 article written by Dick Metcalf for Guns and Ammo magazine which 
criticised the absolutist view resulted in his firing and the subsequent resignation of the 
magazine’s editor-in-chief.  The same year Colorado Senators John Morse and Angela Giron 
were subject to recall elections as a result of their support for tougher gun regulations in the 
aftermath of the shootings in Aurora and Newtown.52  The absolutist view was also apparent 
in the responses by Republicans to President Obama’s 2016 executive actions to strengthen 
the nation’s gun laws.  Texas Senator Ted Cruz called the actions unconstitutional and 
explicitly linked gun control to “government control,” Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan 
accused Obama of “undermin[ing] liberty,” and almost every Republican presidential 
candidate asserted that the actions violated the Second Amendment.53  Such absolutism was 
not shared by all Republicans or by all gun rights supporters but it was increasingly common 
in the public and political debate about guns in the US.  And it was, in part, based on Heller’s 
assertion of an individual right in the Second Amendment, shifting the debate from individual 
versus collective rights to a focus on the extent of the individual right.  It was a 
misinterpretation since Heller also permitted reasonable restrictions on gun ownership, but it 
was an argument made available by the Heller majority. 
Echoing Wilkinson’s 2009 comparison of Heller and Roe v. Wade, just as anti-abortion 
campaigners found great success in targeting legislatures, so too the gun rights lobby’s 
greatest successes came in using the individual rights argument outside of the nation’s courts.  
Encouraging or pressuring legislatures to repeal existing gun laws to make gun ownership 
and use easier has a major procedural advantage: advocates of stricter gun laws cannot bring 
Second Amendment lawsuits which claim that gun laws are not strict enough, thus effectively 
limiting access to the courts as a remedy.  Gun rights advocates found particular success in 
the area of weapons outside the home which became a particular focus after Heller.  At least 
twelve states extended and expanded laws to permit the open or concealed carry of weapons 
in public, including in areas such as schools and parks that might conceivably fall under the 
“sensitive places” exception accepted in Heller.54  While courts continued to frustrate gun 
rights advocates’ attempts to create an almost unlimited right to gun ownership, in the 
legislative and public arena advocates had much more success with an individual rights 
argument.   
The irony of this is that legislative action is what Breyer had supported in dissent in 
Heller.  Breyer’s approach allowed for the kind of deference to legislative decision-making 
that in Michigan and Iowa and a dozen other states led to the loosening of restrictions on 
carrying weapons in public.  While gun rights supporters may not have liked the conclusion 
to which he came in relation to the District’s laws, the same reasoning defended the actions 
of those states which moved towards greater accessibility and whose actions the NRA and 
others lauded.55 Justice Stevens also indicated the importance of the role of the political 
process.  “[N]o-one has suggested,” he wrote, “that the political process is not working 
exactly as it should in mediating the debate between the advocates and opponents of gun 
control.”56  Gun rights and gun control advocates who continued their political and legislative 
battle to define the proper reach of the Second Amendment were thus supported, in 
significant part, by the dissenters in Heller. 
 
3. The Supreme Court 
In 1989, Sanford Levinson argued that the “Supreme Court has almost shamelessly 
refused to discuss the issue” of the Second Amendment.57  Between the Court’s 2010 
application of Heller to the states in McDonald v. Chicago and Scalia’s death in February 
2016, the Justices seemed equally reluctant to get involved in the ongoing Second 
Amendment debate.  Given that the Heller majority made clear that it did not address all 
issues relating to gun rights and the Second Amendment and that, irrespective of their view of 
Heller’s merits, most commentators agreed that significant future litigation would be required 
to develop the full meaning of the Court’s ruling, the Court’s absence requires some 
consideration.58 
Although there are no definitive rules regarding when the Supreme Court will agree to 
hear a case, one major guide has traditionally been a disagreement among the lower courts 
regarding the proper interpretation of federal legislation or provisions of the Constitution.59  
In such a situation, laws intended to apply to all citizens are interpreted in different ways in 
different places undermining the intent of equal application.  Arguably the simplest 
explanation, then, for the Court’s continued refusal to hear argument in the gun rights cases 
appealed to it was that no such split existed among the lower courts.  In states and localities 
where stricter gun laws were enacted, legal challenges were largely rejected by courts relying 
specifically on the wording of Heller.60  Although such rulings might be criticised for reading 
the letter and not the spirit of Heller, an approach described as courts “narrowing from 
below,” the consistent reference to Heller and the narrow reading of its holding meant little 
disagreement among lower state and federal courts across the US.61  In the absence of a major 
split between lower courts in different parts of the country, the Justices were less likely to 
feel compelled to intercede.   
Considered from a different perspective, however, the combination of legal and political 
battles over the extent of the Second Amendment right led to a patchwork of regulations 
across the country.  While places such as the District of Colombia, suburban Chicago, and 
San Francisco enacted strict gun control measures which were upheld by the courts, many 
states, including Texas, Tennessee, and Oklahoma, passed legislation easing older restrictions 
on owning, carrying, and using firearms.  Both options were justified by references to Heller. 
On one hand this could be argued as the essence of federalism in action, allowing states and 
localities the freedom to experiment with local laws and regulations best suited to their 
circumstances.62  It might also be interpreted as an example of judicial restraint: the Court 
recognising that the broad parameters of Heller permitted some degree of divergence among 
local regulations.  On the other hand, the practical result, of fewer regulations in some parts 
of the country and stricter regulations in others, looked a lot like the result that might emerge 
from a disagreement among the lower courts, suggesting the absence of a circuit court split 
may not be the only reason for the Court’s reluctance to intervene. 
A second common reason for the Court to hear a case is confusion over an important area 
of law.  Unquestionably the Second Amendment is such an area, and in 2015 Justices 
Thomas and Scalia made clear that they saw danger in the Court’s inaction on such cases.  
Dissenting from the Court’s refusal to hear argument in cases from San Francisco and 
Highland Park, Illinois, they argued that the lower courts were causing confusion by failing to 
adhere to the central precepts of Heller.  “The decision of the Court of Appeals is in serious 
tension with Heller ... something was seriously amiss in the decision below,” Thomas wrote 
in Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco.63  Jackson involved a city ordinance which 
required owners to either wear their guns while in their home or keep their gun in a locked 
container or disabled with a trigger lock, requirements with clear echoes of the District of 
Columbia law struck down in Heller.64  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois saw a 
challenge to the city’s ordinance banning ownership of assault weapons and high-capacity 
magazines within the city limits.  As in Jackson, the Court’s refusal to hear the case left the 
law intact.  In Friedman, Thomas accused lower courts of “noncompliance with our Second 
Amendment precedents” and described the Seventh Circuit’s rationale as a “crabbed reading” 
of Heller “relegating the Second Amendment to a second-class right.”65  Given the concern 
expressed by Thomas and Scalia that lower courts were causing confusion by ignoring Heller 
and McDonald, why did the Court remain silent? 
Scalia’s 2011 comment to Marcia Coyle that the Court would be unlikely to use the 
Heller reasoning again hinted at one reason.66  Under the Court’s rules it requires only four 
Justices to vote to hear a case, although five are ultimately needed for a majority to decide a 
case.  Of the Heller and McDonald majorities, only Scalia and Thomas were open, consistent 
supporters of the originalist approach so central to both cases, reflected in their joint dissents 
in Jackson and Friedman.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kennedy had in their 
respective careers inclined towards the use of history when necessary without being bound to 
it.  In the aftermath of Heller in particular, the avalanche of criticism from liberals and 
conservatives alike, as well as the voluminous historical work which made the question of 
Second Amendment history so problematic for the Court, it is at least possible that the 
Court’s non-originalists became less sure of its usefulness or value in future Second 
Amendment cases.  Among the dissenters, Breyer obtained the support of Justices Ginsburg, 
Souter, and Stevens, providing a possible four votes to grant a hearing in a future Second 
Amendment case until Souter and Stevens retired in 2009 and 2010 respectively.  The lack of 
action after McDonald indicated either that Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor did 
not subscribe to the views offered by Breyer or that there was no sense that they could attract 
the necessary fifth vote from among the former Heller and McDonald majority.  Either way, 
the Court’s continued silence on the Second Amendment suggested that no theory of 
interpretation attracted a clear majority on the Court.  Since a fractured opinion would 
potentially do more harm than good, to Second Amendment jurisprudence and to the Court’s 
reputation, the Justices’ silence might best be interpreted less as a “shameless refusal” to 
discuss the issue but as an exercise in necessary judicial restraint. 
While the eight years between the ruling in Heller and the death of the majority opinion’s 
author is not a particularly long time for the Court to remain away from the debate, its 
consistent refusal to hear another Second Amendment case in that period is at least notable.  
First, the Court itself agreed that Heller and then McDonald were only the start of the process 
of Second Amendment interpretation hinting, although not suggesting outright, that continued 
engagement with the issue in the near future was likely.  The Court’s subsequent silence 
stood in contrast to the hint of future action.  Second, although there was no division between 
lower courts on fundamental principles of law, in practice differences in legal and legislative 
approaches across the country resulted in a patchwork of Second Amendment interpretation 
that looked very similar to something a circuit split might create.  At the very least it 
suggested that Heller had been interpreted in different ways in different parts of the country.  
Third, Thomas and Scalia’s 2015 dissents from denial of certiorari, combined with objections 
from gun right supporters including the NRA and the variety of actions taken on gun laws 
across the country, suggested that the legacy of Heller was, if not outright confusion, then at 
least deepening divides over the key issues it raised, issues which the Court was uniquely 
placed to address.  That it chose to remain outside of the debate, despite conditions which 
suggested it might take action, is both important and one of the more surprising legacies of 
Heller and McDonald. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In 2007, the year before the Supreme Court agreed to hear Heller, Mark Tushnet argued 
that “the Constitution can’t end the battle over guns.”67  The aftermath of Heller proved him 
right.  No Court scholars would expect that a ruling from the Court in a culture wars case 
would end the debate over a given issue but the impact of Heller on Second Amendment 
debates was particularly surprising.  Offering, on the surface, exactly what gun rights 
advocates had campaigned for, Heller led to the limiting or undermining of key tenets of the 
gun control argument, whether as a result of the debates about the use of history by Scalia 
and Stevens or in Heller’s recognition that an individual right to bear arms for self-defence 
could be legitimately limited in a number of important ways.  Such results were not only 
surprising but had significant implications for Second Amendment debates.   
Of the Court’s absence from the debate over the Second Amendment before Heller, Adam 
Winkler wrote: “the result was anything but a gradual move towards consensus.  Instead, the 
Court’s absence allowed the forces of unreason to command the field … extremists were free 
to cast the Second Amendment in their own preferred terms … Neither side felt the need to 
compromise because total victory was still possible.”68  Charles’ observations of the rise of 
Second Amendment absolutism in the political realm suggested the Court’s absence from the 
debate resulted in the same polarization post-Heller that Winkler identified in pre-Heller 
politics.  The response to President Obama’s January 2016 executive orders only reinforced 
Charles’ conclusions.  The result of Heller was not, as Winkler hoped, a more reasonable 
discussion about reducing gun violence in the US, but instead continued, and perhaps more 
extreme, polarization.69  Those differences were increasingly reflected in the nation’s 
patchwork of gun laws, only further emphasising differences between red and blue states or 
even, in the case of San Francisco and Highland Park, between red and blue towns and 
counties.  In such a context, the vast majority of courts which upheld gun control laws using 
Heller as a foundation appeared to be, or could be portrayed as, making decisions based less 
on legal principles and more on political grounds clothed in the language of the law.  Both 
only intensified the battle. 
Meanwhile, the shifting politics and the controversy over Heller’s legal foundations 
appeared to be keeping the Court, arguably the only institution able to clarify the meaning of 
Heller, out of the debate.  Despite the appeals by Thomas and Scalia in 2015, the Court’s 
majority remained unwilling to re-enter a debate for which it was partly responsible.  The 
exact reasons for the Court’s absence remain obscure, and are likely to remain so until the 
papers of the current Justices are made available to scholars, an event several decades in the 
future.  But to those familiar with the Court, knowledge of its usual working practices 
provide some hints.  The signs are that no theoretical or jurisprudential approach drew a 
majority of the Justices.  The significant criticism of the approaches taken by Scalia and 
Stevens in Heller, the alternative offered by Breyer, and subsequent personnel change on the 
Court played a role in shifting the Justices’ alliances.  Nothing, from the Court’s perspective, 
was to be gained by entering the debate without a clear majority for a particular approach.  
Equally, in the absence of a split between the lower courts, nothing compelled the Justices to 
become involved either.   
At the time of writing (November 2016), the future direction of Second Amendment 
jurisprudence remains unclear.  Donald Trump promised in his election campaign to appoint 
justices who supported Second Amendment rights; with the Senate under Republican control 
a successful nomination seems likely.  But the impact that person might have on the Court’s 
Second Amendment jurisprudence remains in the realms of speculation and is likely to do so 
for some time.70  The unanimous per curiam opinion in Caetano v. Massachusetts, handed 
down by the Court a month after Scalia’s death, indicated eight Justices were committed to 
Heller as precedent, but, as the experience of the lower courts indicates, Heller can mean 
different things to different people and could just as easily result in a broad or narrow reading 
of Second Amendment rights.71  Caetano, striking down a Massachusetts law banning 
possession of stun guns, provided little indication of future action by the Justices since the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts so clearly employed a rationale rejected in Heller.  
While a greater attention to history in law may well be one of Scalia’s greatest legacies, 
originalism remains a controversial judicial philosophy and one that does not appear to 
command a majority on the Court, a situation unlikely to change as the result of the 
appointment of one additional Justice.  Which approach does eventually draw together a new 
majority will be crucial for the future direction of the Second Amendment.  As and when the 
Court does grant certiorari in a new gun rights case, whether prompted by a circuit split or by 
the emergence of a consensus within the Court, the ruling will be handed down in a situation 
that is arguably even more polarised as a result of the debate over Heller.  Thus any decision 
is even less likely to end the battle over the Second Amendment.   
That the debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment will change and develop 
over time is unquestioned, that the Court will eventually rejoin the debate assured, although 
whether that is sooner or later remains to be seen.  But irrespective of the long term legacy of 
Heller and McDonald, the early responses to both mark a particular moment in the debate 
about the extent of gun rights and the scope of the Second Amendment in the United States in 
the early 21st Century, one which shows that the impact of a Court decision may not always 
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